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INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 has marked the ten-year anniversary 
of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) and seen the 
start of the development of a new strategy for the 
EaP, which is to be announced by mid-2020. A new 
European Commission took office on December 1, 
and according to its president, Ursula von der Ley-
en, “the European Union’s future is shaped and tied 
in with the future of its neighbors and its partners. 
A stable, secure and prosperous region around our 
Union is therefore of paramount importance. The EU 
should be present and active across our neighbor-
hood, cooperating on common challenges and op-
portunities and providing support for essential re-
forms.”1 In her mission letter to Commissioner for 
Neighborhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi, von 
der Leyen asked him to “take the Eastern Partnership 
to the next level” by proposing a new set of long-
term policy objectives for the EaP.
The changing domestic and geopolitical environment 
of the last ten years, and its effects on the EaP coun-
tries and the EU member states make this a chal-
lenging task. Zigzagging sociopolitical and econom-
ic developments in the EaP countries, the capacity to 
act of the EU (and of Germany, a particularly import-
ant player in the region), and the rising influence of 
third powers in the region are among the main fac-
tors that have profoundly changed the nature of the 
relationship between the EU and its neighborhood. 
The changing context therefore needs to be consid-
ered in the design of the next set of policy objectives 
and instruments. The EU and its member states, 
however, lack a clear strategy and a political vision 
for how to further engage with the eastern neigh-
1 European Commission, Mission Letter, Commissioner-designate for Neighborhood and Enlargement, November 7, 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/president-elect_von_der_leyens_mission_letter_to_oliver_varhelyi.pdf> (accessed November 19, 2019).
borhood. This report analyzes these factors that the 
EU should consider when engaging with the EaP 
countries in times of crisis and external pressure be-
yond 2020.
In the opening chapter Sergiy Gerasymchuk, head 
of the South-Eastern Europe studies at the For-
eign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism,” reflects up-
on the domestic developments in the last decade in 
the EaP countries and how they should be factored 
in the EU’s policy thinking. The EaP countries did not 
evolve into the ring of stable and democratic friends 
that the EU had hoped for. They have experienced 
various degrees of change in their domestic poli-
tics and foreign policy orientations. While some em-
braced a pro-European reform agenda very quickly, 
others were more reticent. Moreover, the pro-Euro-
pean declarations of the most willing EaP countries 
– Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine – have not always been 
translated into full implementation of reforms. Geor-
gia increasingly stalls in reforms and faces a high-
ly unstable political environment. Moldova, with the 
exception of the recent half-year interregnum un-
der the government of Maia Sandu (June-Novem-
ber 2019), is backsliding on its democratic progress. 
Ukraine not only struggles with entrenched oligar-
chic structures, including under its new president, 
Volodymyr Zelensky, but also faces an armed conflict 
with Russia in the Donbas region. Western coun-
tries have not always understood the nature of these 
changes and hence have lacked a strategy for how to 
address them.
As a result, a difficult relationship between the EU 
and these countries has produced a deep ‘Eastern 
Partnership fatigue’ in Europe and in the neighbor-
hood in recent years. As the EaP was being concep-
tualized and launched, the EU was hit hard by the 
financial and economic crisis of 2008 and its rever-
berations. Since then, the EU has not only been deal-
ing with ongoing internal challenges and divisions 
that have shifted the focus of Brussels and EU cap-
itals inwards, it has also been in a constant mode of 
managing parallel external crises. While some mem-
ber states are still interested in investing in and 
strengthening democratic and stable regimes on the 
EU’s eastern border, others would like to reduce any 
such actions or initiatives. In his contribution,  Stefan 
Meister, head of the Heinrich Boell Foundation Tbili-
si Office – South Caucasus Region, analyses in par-
ticular Germany’s capacity to act in the neighbor-
hood in a changing geopolitical environment.
The EU lacks a clear  
strategy and a political 
vision for how to further 
engage with the eastern 
neighborhood
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The eastern neighborhood is at the crossroads of a new 
geopolitical configuration that developed in a direction that 
the EU did not envision when it launched the EaP. In the 
third chapter, Stanislav  Secrieru, senior analyst at the Eu-
ropean Union Institute for Security Studies, explains the 
rise of third powers in Eastern Europe and what it means 
for the EU. In the last decade the EaP countries have found 
themselves increasingly at the intersection of the interests 
of competing great powers that have changed the geopo-
litical environment. The ongoing conflict between an in-
creasingly assertive and aggressive Russia and the West, the 
growing efforts at Russian-led regional integration, and in-
creasing interests and financial investment from China as it 
implements its Belt and Road Initiative have put pressures 
on the EaP states. Additionally, a consensus between the EU 
and the United States on the region can no longer be taken 
for granted. Still, the EU needs a functioning security sys-
tem on its eastern border while maintaining amicable rela-
tions with competing powers. 
The hopes of the Eastern Partnership project have not been 
fully realized against this background of domestic challeng-
es in EU member states, growing Russian assertiveness and 
third powers’ influence shaping the new geopolitical and 
geo-economic environment of Eastern Europe, discontent 
with EU’s slow and reactive mode of interaction with the 
EaP countries, lack of significant progress, and the emer-
gence of new models of state development and foreign pol-
icy orientation in the EaP region. The EU needs a new ap-
proach towards its eastern neighborhood that would reflect 
these new realities. 
The last chapter, authored by Cristina Gherasimov, re-
search fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP), looks at whether the EU can use the June 2020 
EaP summit to propose a common vision for its engage-
ment with the region beyond 2020, and explains why the EU 
needs to offer a ‘credible framework’ for relations with its 
eastern neighbors.
The Conclusions and Recommendations section of this re-
port draws on the main findings of the Russia-Eastern Part-
nership Strategy Group which met between January and 
December 2019 at the German Council on Foreign Relations, 
in Berlin.
Figure 1: Democracy score in EaP  
countries between 2009-2018
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Figure 2: Corruption in EaP countries 
between 2009-2018
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Figure 3: Judicial independence in EaP 
countries between 2009-2018
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Source for all figures: Freedom House, Nations in Transit Report data for 2009-2018
The Freedom House “Nations in Transit Report” democracy score covers seven categories: 
electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local 
democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption.
This indicator assesses constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, 
judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the 
law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.
This indicator looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policy-
makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption 
initiatives.
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THE EU’S EASTERN 
NEIGHBORHOOD UNDER 
DOMESTIC CHANGE 
After the last wave of enlargement, the EU elabo-
rated a new kind of policy toward its neighbors, one 
that is less focused on further enlargement and more 
on establishing neighborly relations with them. Brus-
sels has invested economic and political resources 
into forming a democracy and security belt around 
the union. That was an overall objective of the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy, but for six eastern 
neighbors – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine – the EU has applied a tailored 
approach under the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which 
was brokered mostly by Poland and Sweden. The 
EaP set up thematic platforms for multilateral dia-
logue and cooperation among the six partner coun-
tries, the member states, the European Commission 
and other EU institutions. The themes are good gov-
ernance, stability, democracy, economic integration 
and convergence with EU policies, energy security, 
and people-to-people contacts. The expert commu-
nities in these countries complain that security di-
mension is missing, however. 
Although the EaP fueled many reforms in these areas 
in the countries concerned, the six still vary in their 
level of democratization and Europeanization. They 
also have different approaches in their relations with 
the EU (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine signed As-
sociation Agreements that were game-changers for 
setting reform agendas and accelerating their imple-
mentation), with Russia (which claims the EaP coun-
tries are part of its natural sphere of interest), and 
with other players active in the region. 
Armenia and Belarus are the EaP countries politi-
cally closest to Russia and most distant from the EU. 
Russian domination affects their domestic agenda 
and limits the speed of their reforms. The recent de-
velopments in Armenia do not prove that the coun-
try’s domestic transformation is irreversible. In Be-
larus there is absolutely no ground to expect any 
Figure 4: Eastern Partnership Countries
Democracy Judicial independence Corruption
Ratings are based on a scale of 1 (best) to 7 (worst)
4.64 5.75 5.75
Ukraine
6.61 7.00 6.00
Belarus
5.43 5.50 5.50
Armenia
4.93 5.00 6.00
Moldova
4.68 5.00 4.50
Georgia
6.93 7.00 7.00
Azerbaĳan
All shown scores are from the year 2018
Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit Report data for 2018; Flags: Vathanx, https://www.iconfinder.com/iconsets/world-flag-icons (CC BY-NC 3.0 NL)
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serious political changes. Both countries often at-
tempt to demonstrate their sovereignty and inde-
pendent foreign policy but de facto they have to sub-
ordinate their choices to Russian priorities (their 
voting record on Ukraine-related resolutions in the 
United Nations General Assembly is indicative in this 
regard). This subordination is ensured by their close 
economic ties with Russia and the Russian military 
presence on their territory. 
Under such circumstances it is highly unlikely that 
Armenia or Belarus would be willing and could 
change their relations with Russia and follow a Eu-
ropean path. Both accepted membership in the Eur-
asian Economic Union, the Russian project designed 
as the alternative to EU integration. Russia can al-
ways use its economic, political, and security lever-
age to prevent any Western pivot by Armenia or Be-
larus, to ensure the loyalty of their political elites, 
and to limit the path of the reforms in both coun-
tries. Russia’s propaganda also labels them as belong-
ing to its exclusive zone of influence, signaling to the 
EU to abstain from additional integration efforts. 
The same is true for Azerbaijan. Although it is less 
economically dependent on Russia, it still bears the 
burden of the frozen conflict with Armenia over Na-
gorno-Karabakh and relies on Russian security guar-
antees, including supplies of weapons, that prevent it 
from breaking ties. Besides, the country’s authoritar-
ian system, distinct lack of good governance, elimi-
nation of any kind of opposition, and lack of drivers 
for reforms (for example, an Association Agreement) 
limit its European integration and makes its democ-
ratization prospects murky.
The situation is different with Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine. The explicit will of the voters who support-
ed the pro-European elites in these countries and 
the signing of Association Agreements (which cat-
alyze greater alignment with the EU and fuel trade 
with it) ensured significant progress in reforms, de-
mocratization, and Europeanization alongside an 
economic reorientation toward European mar-
kets. Besides, the open conflicts between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008 and between Russia and Ukraine 
since 2014, as well as the frozen conflict in Moldo-
va since 1992, prevent these countries’ security co-
operation with Moscow. On the contrary, they per-
ceive Russia as the main source of their security 
challenges.
However, this does not mean the Europeanization 
agenda is irreversible or inevitable for Georgia, Mol-
dova, and Ukraine. Notwithstanding the progress 
they have made, weak and corrupt elites that are 
rhetorically at least pro-Europe often compromise 
the idea of European integration per se. Slow and 
costly reforms also cause disappointment and “Eu-
ropean fatigue” among the populations. In the case 
of Moldova, the attempt of Maia Sandu’s short-lived 
government to accelerate reforms failed and the au-
thoritarian trend endures. In all three countries, 
some politicians use security arguments to excuse 
lack of democratization and delays with the imple-
mentation of vital reforms. 
Russia’s hybrid aggression against the three coun-
tries that signed Association Agreements with the 
EU should not be underestimated. It does its best 
to make the price of European integration high for 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Simultaneously, Rus-
sia’s assertiveness is growing and its propaganda la-
bels these countries as weak or failed states to limit 
European enthusiasm toward them and thus integra-
tion efforts.
In order to ensure further progress in the democ-
ratization and Europeanization of the EaP countries, 
additional efforts are needed. The experience of the 
Central and Eastern European EU member states 
proves that imposing conditionality alongside an ex-
plicit and credible accession perspective can sig-
nificantly accelerate reforms. Adoption of EU norms 
and regulations can increase considerably with the 
launch of accession negotiations.
Given Russia’s assertive approach and hybrid meth-
ods in the EaP countries, the EU also has to take in-
to consideration their security concerns and in-
vest more into hard security for them. Otherwise 
the prospects of converting the EaP countries into 
a European security and democracy belt will remain 
poor.
Sergiy Gerasymchuk is the 
deputy chairman of the board and 
the head of South-Eastern Europe 
studies at the Foreign Policy 
Council “Ukrainian Prism”
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RETHINKING THE EASTERN 
PARTNERSHIP: THE 
GERMAN PERSPECTIVE
Changing Environment
Ten years after the launch of the EU’s Eastern Part-
nership (EaP), its main aims have not changed. The 
goal remains to create stable states in its eastern 
neighborhood, to open markets there, and help to 
transform the six countries concerned1 into market 
economies and democracies. Despite some success-
es when it comes to Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreements, Association Agreements, and vi-
sa-liberalization in the case Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine as well as the growing role of civil societies 
in challenging selfish elites, typical post-Soviet pat-
terns of vested interests, corruption, informal poli-
tics, and the lack of rule of law are still present in all 
six. At the same time, the environment in which the 
EaP policy is implemented has changed, and the EU 
itself and its relationship with the United States are 
in deep crisis. The conflict with Russia over the com-
mon neighborhood, most visible in the annexation of 
Crimea and the war in the Donbas region of Ukraine, 
has become a key challenge for the EaP. It also fuels 
the discussion among EU member states about how 
far they can go to integrate these states against Rus-
sia’s wishes. 
Furthermore, the difficult relationship with Turkey, 
the war in Syria, the conflict with Iran, and China’s 
growing activities in Eastern and East-Central Eu-
rope create a new environment for the EU’s neigh-
borhood policy. The deterioration in relations with 
the United States challenges not only global trade 
1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
2 “EU Top Diplomat Nominee Urges Bloc to Look East,” Financial Times, October 7, 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/4b564d78-e919-11e9-a240-
3b065ef5fc55> (accessed October 20, 2019).
3 Stefan Meister, “Nord Stream 2: The Dead End of Germany‘s Ostpolitik,” Berlin Policy Journal, February 20, 2019. <https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/
publications/further-publications/nord-stream-2-dead-end-germanys-ostpolitik> (accessed October 20, 2019).
and the economic basis for welfare in the EU but al-
so the role of NATO in European security. The EU is 
not prepared for these comprehensive foreign and 
security challenges, and its member states are divid-
ed on how to react to them. At the same time, they 
lack serious political will to further integrate and to 
strengthen the role of EU institutions.
The challenges for the EU from the departure of the 
United Kingdom, growing populism, digitalization, 
terrorism, and migration fuel trends toward nation-
alism and national solutions to common problems. 
While in the past the EU was always more united 
in situations of crisis, its decision-making process-
es are now unable to cope with the stress test posed 
by too many crises. The lack of leadership or willing-
ness to invest more resources in a common foreign 
and security policy becomes even more visible in the 
eastern neighborhood and the Balkans. The EU’s new 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Securi-
ty Policy, Josep Borell, has argued that the main pri-
ority of the EU should be these two regions, and that 
if the EU fails here it will fail as a global actor.2 At 
the same time the block put by Denmark, France, and 
the Netherlands on the accession process for Alba-
nia and North Macedonia will also have consequenc-
es when it comes to developing any ambitious ideas 
with regard to the frontrunner states in the EaP, no 
matter what the European Commission or the high 
representative say. 
Germany’s Role and Ambitions
Germany – the biggest economy in Europe as well 
as one of the main drivers for eastern enlargement 
after the Cold War and the EU’s policy toward Rus-
sia and the post-Soviet countries – is not willing and 
not able to lead the EU in the way needed in this sit-
uation. Its support for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline al-
so divides the member states, and it undermines the 
stabilization and transformation policy of the EU to-
ward Ukraine.3 While enlargement was crucial in sta-
bilizing Europe and its eastern borders as well as in 
opening up new markets and providing a cheap la-
bor force for German industry, Berlin’s main aim to-
ward the EaP countries has always been stabilization, 
not integration. 
Germany now faces a dilemma. Its elites and society 
are traditionally very cautious about provoking Rus-
EU’s decision-making  
processes are now unable 
to cope with the stress test 
posed by too many crises
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sia in their common neighborhood and are willing to 
accept a Russian sphere of influence. Russia still is a 
key supplier of gas and oil to German industry and is 
seen by many as a stabilizer for the whole post-So-
viet region. However, as a result of the conflict in 
Ukraine, Moscow has become in the eyes of many 
German elites a destabilizing actor in the common 
neighborhood – one that stands against internation-
al law, democratization, and the rule of law, and cre-
ates or uses conflicts to keep its “near abroad” under 
control. Germany plays a leading role in maintaining 
the EU sanction regime against Russia in the context 
of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, 
but at the same time it wants to settle the conflict 
with Moscow and develop a new modus vivendi. 
Against this background, there is no appetite in Ger-
many for further enlargement of the EU. The May 
2019 parliamentary motion of the ruling Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and So-
cial Democratic Party coalition in the Bundestag on 
the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the EaP4 
shows that the country’s current leadership is step-
ping back from its earlier position, shown in its 2017 
motion, and is more openly arguing against a mem-
bership perspective for the six countries.5
The idea of a European Ostpolitik, the latest initiative 
of the German Foreign Office and promoted by For-
eign Minister Heiko Maas, goes in the right direction 
by attempting to improve communication and coor-
dination between Germany and EU member states 
in East-Central Europe on policy toward the EaP re-
gion.6 But, at the same time, this initiative reflects 
the lack of vision in Germany. It is an inward-looking 
policy for the EU that offers more intense exchange 
on eastern policy between Germany and Central 
Eastern member states rather than a conceptual or 
even strategic policy toward the neighborhood.
This lack of ambition and leadership reflects the sta-
tus quo approach of German foreign policy in ma-
ny areas under the current government. As the coali-
tion’s May 2019 motion argues, there should be more 
economic cooperation and civil-society funding for 
the EaP countries but no further steps to integrate 
4 Deutscher Bundestag, “Antrag der Fraktionen CDU/CSU und SPD, 10 Jahre Östliche Partnerschaft der Europäischen Union – Für eine intensive 
Zusammenarbeit auf dem Weg zu Wohlstand, Sicherheit und Demokratie,” May 7, 2019. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/099/1909916.pdf> 
(accessed October 19, 2019).
5 Deutscher Bundestag, “Antrag der Fraktionen CDU/CSU und SPD, Östliche Partnerschaft der Europäischen Union entschlossen gestalten und 
konsequent fortsetzen,” June 27, 2017. <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/129/1812942.pdf> (accessed October 19, 2019).
6 Auswärtiges Amt, Begrüßungsrede von Außenminister Heiko Maas anlässlich des Berliner Forums Außenpolitik, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/
de/newsroom/maas-berliner-forum-aussenpolitik/2164430> (accessed October 20, 2019).
7 European Commission, “Vertretung in Deutschland, EU startet Konsultationen über die künftige östliche Partnerschaft,” July 26, 2019. <https://
ec.europa.eu/germany/news/20190726-konsultation-oestliche-partnerschaft_de> (accessed October 19, 2019).
8 European Commission, Mission Letter, Commissioner-designate for Neighborhood and Enlargement, September 10, 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-laszlo-trocsanyi_en.pdf> (accessed October 19, 2019).
them or to upgrade the EaP. The motion supports 
differentiation and the “more for more” principle, 
and Germany is a country that invests a lot into eco-
nomic development, educational exchanges, legal 
reforms, and democratization in the EaP countries. 
But to go beyond the current policy, which has not 
helped to overcome their domestic problems, and to 
rethink why many initiatives have failed, is not part 
of the government’s approach. “Keep it up” is the 
logic of Germany’s policy.
Ahead of Germany’s EU Presidency in 2020
Germany’s EU presidency in the second half of next 
year and the demand from the Bundestag for de-
bates about the further elaboration of the EaP after 
2020 (without specification), along with the start of 
a new European Commission, could offer an oppor-
tunity for new initiatives. But neither new Europe-
an Commission President Ursula von der Leyen nor 
the current German decision-makers will perceive 
neighborhood policy as crucial. Although the EU has 
undergone a comprehensive, structured consultation 
process on the EaP, to which nearly everybody could 
contribute, there is no clarity as to what comes next 
and how to use this feedback.7 Even though von der 
Leyen asked in her mission letter to the new com-
missioner for neighborhood and enlargement for the 
development of new long-term policies for the EaP’s 
next decade,8 political will from the member states is 
needed to go beyond by the issues she mentions, like 
There is need for  
a discussion about how to 
face the security challenges 
in all EaP countries
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the implementation of the Association Agreements 
or the full use of the Support Group for Ukraine. 
Therefore, there will be more actions such as youth 
exchanges, educational projects, and funding for civil 
society with German support, but no serious political 
debate about a vision for the future of the EaP coun-
tries in relation to the EU.
The creation of the new position of an EaP ambas-
sador is symptomatic of Germany’s eastern neigh-
borhood policy. This could be a strong signal that 
it wants to upgrade its EaP policy and lead the EU 
in the neighborhood together with those member 
states that also have an EaP ambassador.9 Howev-
er, there is neither vision nor direction for action for 
this new position. The EaP ambassador appears to 
have no decision-making responsibilities and seems 
to focus on improving communication with the oth-
er member states. This is another step that is a re-
action to the dynamics in the EU rather than in the 
neighborhood, and the holder of the position has no 
mandate to challenge the status quo in Germany’s 
EaP approach.
9 Other EU member states with ambassadors-at-large for EaP are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, and Slovakia.
10 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “Poland proposes closer ties for EU Eastern Partnership nations,” May 14, 2019. <https://www.rferl.org/a/poland-
proposes-closer-ties-for-eu-eastern-partnership-nations/29940556.html> (accessed October 19, 2019).
Beside the discussion about more sectoral integra-
tion10 in the likes of digitalization, roaming and ener-
gy, there is need for a discussion about how to face 
the security challenges in all EaP countries, how to 
improve their socioeconomic development, and how 
to overcome their post-Soviet legacy. In early 2020 
Germany will have a new, more liberal law on labor 
migration for some sectors; it could open up these 
areas of the labor market for those EaP countries 
that have a visa liberalization agreement with the EU. 
There will be no NATO membership for EaP coun-
tries anytime soon, but the EU could support the 
transformation and modernization of their securi-
ty institutions, including in areas of human security. 
As long as key member states are not discussing the 
main areas of development for the societies of the 
EaP countries and not linking EU policy more closely 
to their civil-society support, the EU will keep failing 
in its goal of creating stable democracies and market 
economies in its eastern neighborhood.
Dr Stefan Meister is an associate 
fellow at the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP) and 
the head of the Heinrich Boell 
Foundation Tbilisi Office – South 
Caucasus Region
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THE RISE OF THIRD POWERS 
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND 
WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE EU
The EU has expanded its footprint in its eastern 
neighborhood over the last decade. But so did some 
“third powers,” meaning a group of countries other 
than Western ones and Russia. In the space of ten 
years China has become one of the top five trading 
partners of each of the countries of the Eastern Part-
nership (EaP), while Turkey is also among the top five 
for some of them. The Arab Gulf states have extend-
ed their diplomatic representations, made their first 
lucrative investments, and launched direct flights 
to the EaP capitals. China has opened cultural cen-
ters across the region, while Iranian tourists flock 
in greater numbers to Armenia and Georgia. Turkey 
supplied Ukraine with its first attack drones, while 
Israel helped Azerbaijan strengthen its naval forc-
es in the Caspian Sea. Compelled since 2014 to focus 
more on Russia’s malign actions in the region, the EU 
overlooked the rise of the third powers. As the EU 
mulls upgrading its eastern neighborhood policy in 
2020, it needs to better understand the greater pres-
ence of the third players there, to assess their influ-
ence and impact, and to devise a set of responses. 
Reciprocal Embrace
Two mutually reinforcing trends explain the rise of 
the third powers in the EU’s eastern neighborhood: 
their growing relative power at the global level and 
the greater penchant of the EaP states for diversify-
ing their economic and diplomatic ties. 
The third powers’ greater presence in the region is 
linked to their respective transformations. Over the 
last decade or two, almost all of them became more 
prosperous, more potent militarily, and/or more 
confident diplomatically. As their standing as in-
ternational powers rose, they became more out-
ward-looking. As a result, the third powers’ outreach 
has extended to regions previously untouched or 
where they had played only a minor role. The EU’s 
eastern neighborhood is a case in point. 
However, this does not mean that the EU’s eastern 
neighborhood has become a priority for the third 
powers; their vital security and economic interests 
still lie elsewhere. Iran and Turkey focus overwhelm-
ingly on managing wars and supporting clients in 
the Middle East. China’s foreign policy resources are 
mostly channeled to ensuring preeminence in the 
Pacific Asia. Nevertheless, the third powers do not 
hesitate to seize any opportunities in the region to 
make financial gains, to recruit diplomatic support 
for their international initiatives, to secure access 
to the natural resources necessary to sustain their 
respective economic boom, to obtain military and 
space technologies, or to gain access from there to 
the vast European market. So far, this opportunistic 
approach has tended to pay off.
This drive to exploit opportunities falls on fertile 
ground in the region. Guided by imperatives to avoid, 
diminish, or escape from overreliance on any sin-
gle power, the EaP states eagerly welcome and al-
so encourage the third powers’ overtures. They fa-
cilitate or remove visa requirements, bestow honors 
and titles on their leaders, organize trade missions, 
and invite wealthy investors to attend business fo-
rums. This approach is often a reaction to Russia’s 
military and economic assertiveness across the re-
gion. For this reason, outreach to the third powers 
is practiced not only by Moldova and Ukraine, who 
have sustained trade restrictions from Russia pri-
or to and after signing their EU Association Agree-
ments, but also by Armenia and Belarus, which are 
Russia’s economic and military allies. For example, as 
Russia openly conditioned in 2019 further financial 
assistance to Belarus to closer economic and polit-
ical integration, the latter contracted a $100 million 
loan with the China Development Bank and it is ne-
gotiating another $500 million loan with it. The more 
Russia pushes its neighbors, the keener they are to 
initiate and deepen relations with the third powers 
to fend off economic pressure, defend their political 
sovereignty, and, if possible, reach a deal with Mos-
cow on better terms. 
At the same time, the EaP countries leverage their 
growing relations with the third powers to elude or 
weaken the EU democratic conditionality. The re-
gion’s authoritarian rulers wish to signal to the EU 
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that they have alternative sources of international le-
gitimacy and funds if it does not soften or give up 
on its principled stance (for example, regarding the 
release of political prisoners, respect for free me-
dia, and conducting free and fair elections). Thus, the 
third powers’ rise has direct implications for the EU’s 
neighborhood policy.
A Blessing and a Curse
The rise of the third powers in its eastern neigh-
borhood simultaneously upholds and undermines 
the EU’s interests. They contribute to the capaci-
ty of the EaP states to survive sustained economic 
shocks induced externally on purpose. Seen this way, 
they are stabilizers acting in tune with the EU policy 
goals. China’s burgeoning agricultural imports from 
Ukraine (it became a top-five purchaser of Ukrainian 
food products in 2018) make Russia’s market-access 
lever over the country less effective. Similarly, more 
transport connections, visa-free regimes, and a larg-
er influx of tourists from the third powers weakens 
Russia’s capacity to use tourist flows as a political 
lever. The number of visitors from China to Arme-
nia increased by 107 percent in first nine months of 
2018, albeit from a low base. The trend is expected 
to continue after the two countries signed a visa-ex-
emption agreement this year. In Moldova, a growing 
volume of remittances from the third powers (for ex-
ample, Israel, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates) 
is challenging Russia’s position as the second prin-
cipal source (after the EU) of such funds and thus 
erodes another of the Kremlin’s lever. Investments 
and the potential relocation of production from the 
third powers could help integrate the EaP states in 
global chains of production, thus helping to diversi-
fy their economies. For example, an Israeli compa-
ny has invested $85 million in a plant in Georgia that 
produces spare parts for manufacturers of civilian 
aircrafts, such as Airbus, Boeing, and Bombardier. 
In the political field, more often than not the third 
powers support the territorial integrity of the EaP 
states or at least take a neutral stance on the is-
sue. While Turkey and Arab Gulf States voted for the 
2008 UN resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh support-
ing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, China re-
frained from vetoing the 2014 UN Security Council 
resolution condemning the “referendum” in Crimea, 
leaving Russia isolated. The third powers also often 
play a positive role in the management of the pro-
tracted conflicts in the region. For instance, Turkey 
negotiated the release of Tatar leaders from annexed 
Crimea in 2017 and Iran helped calm down the situ-
ation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the wake 
of the Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016. 
Arguably, the more they are drawn in economically 
into the region, the more they will care about the se-
curity of their newly acquired assets, of infrastruc-
tures that facilitate trade, and of their citizens who 
reside or spend vacations there. This could have a 
positive impact on security in the region by reducing 
the appetite of other powers to resort to force there.
However, there is another side of the coin that is less 
positive for the transformative agenda the EU has for 
the region. Sometimes the third powers blunt the 
EU’s normative influence by floating the possibili-
ty of or offering loans lacking any conditionality to 
the EaP countries. For example, as the EU suspend-
ed financial assistance to Moldova, whose authori-
ties embarked on an authoritarian path, the govern-
ment approached the Chinese Development Bank 
for a $190 million loan to repair the country’s roads. 
Injections of cash from the third powers can allevi-
ate the financial situation in the EaP countries in the 
short term, but they may also lead to a debt trap and 
imperil the macroeconomic stability of borrowers 
in the long term, due to much higher interest rates 
than those offered by the EU financial institutions. 
Another effect of the greater economic presence 
of the third powers is the swelling of trade deficits 
run by some EaP states as the value of their imports 
from, say, China or Turkey often grow faster than 
their exports to these countries. For example, in last 
decade, Belarus’s negative trade balance with Turkey 
swelled from $108 million to over $600 million. 
The third powers also often lack, or have a weak 
tradition when it comes to, the application of the 
rule of law. Therefore, they might export harmful, 
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non-transparent business practices or promote au-
thoritarian solutions in the political realm in the re-
gion. For example, Turkey’s recent campaign against 
the Gülenist movement network and to repatri-
ate, sometimes forcefully, its members living abroad 
have led to human-rights violations in the EaP coun-
tries to which their governments were accomplices. 
Turkey appears to have relied on its economic clout 
to ensure the cooperation of the local authorities. 
Thus, a greater economic presence of the third pow-
ers might undermine EU’s efforts to cultivate and 
strengthen the rule of law in the region. 
The EU’s Transformative Power in a Multi-Player  
Neighborhood
The third powers’ growing footprint in the EU’s east-
ern neighborhood is not a passing phenomenon; it 
is a trend that heralds a change in the region’s po-
litical, economic and, to an extent, security climate 
in the coming decade. The region is firmly moving 
away from a two-dimensional environment shaped 
by the West and Russia to an increasingly compet-
itive multi-player one. This imposes constraints on 
the EU, but it also offers opportunities. First, the 
EU has to scrutinize more the growing diversifica-
tion of trade relations and diplomatic partnerships 
in its eastern neighborhood. But greater awareness 
and knowledge is only the first step. The next one re-
quires devising a dual-track strategy that reinforces 
and multiplies the benign elements of the rise of the 
third powers in the region and neutralizes its nega-
tive consequences.
The EU’s agenda often overlaps with that of the third 
powers (for example, boosting trade or prevent-
ing conflicts) and this provides space for coopera-
tion, coordination, or parallel actions that ultimate-
ly strengthen the statehood and economic resilience 
of the EaP states. The EU could increase its assis-
tance aimed at making the EaP countries’ exports 
more competitive, thus helping them to get the most 
not only from the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreements with the EU, but also from their 
free-trade agreements with Turkey, China, or Israel. 
EU assistance for developing their respective tour-
ism sector may create new jobs in the EaP states and 
lure even more tourists, including those from the 
third powers. As Iran mends its relations with Azer-
baijan and deepens its ties with Armenia, it could be 
a useful diplomatic partner in averting a re-escala-
tion of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey 
could prove to be a valuable partner in endeavors to 
restore and guarantee the rights of the Tatars in an-
nexed Crimea, as well as to ensure the harmonious 
development of Gagauzian autonomy within Moldo-
va’s internationally recognized borders and to com-
plement the EU’s policy of ‘engagement without rec-
ognition’ in Abkhazia. 
To defuse the negative effects of the third powers’ 
rise in its eastern neighborhood, the EU will have to 
rely more on closer alliances with like-minded actors 
(the United States, Canada, Japan, the Internation-
al Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction, and Development). This will 
help it muster bigger financial resources in support 
of its transformational agenda. It will also facilitate a 
more coordinated and effective conditionality aiming 
to promote the rule of law, to undercut corruption, 
to foster functional institutions, and to create a wel-
coming environment for investors across the region. 
The EU will also have to foster deeper partnerships 
with various segments of local civil society whose 
role in shaping politics in the EaP countries has dra-
matically increased. And, as the latest elections in 
Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine have shown, the 
fight against corruption and for the rule of law en-
joys overwhelming popular support and coincides 
with citizens’ expectations. Moreover, these changes 
are often associated in the mind of the region’s peo-
ples with increasingly close cooperation with the EU. 
Thus, as long the EU stays true to its transformative 
credo, it will enjoy a significant advantage in its east-
ern neighborhood despite the rise of the third pow-
ers there. 
Dr Stanislav Secrieru is a senior 
analyst at the European Union 
Institute for Security Studies
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A NEW ‘MOMENTUM’ FOR THE 
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP IN 2020 
The 2019-2020 period is an important one for the 
states of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Euro-
pean Union (EU). It marks a decade since the EaP was 
launched, as well as the endpoint for the implementa-
tion of the 20 Deliverables for 2020. Europe also cel-
ebrates thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
and it is almost three decades since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. This is a historically resonant time 
for the EU and its eastern neighbors to redefine their 
partnership.
In June 2020 a new Eastern Partnership summit will 
take place during Croatia’s EU presidency. Deriving 
from European Commission President Ursula von der 
Leyen’s mission letter to Commissioner for Neigh-
borhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi, there is an 
expectation that the EU will present a long-awaited 
new strategy for the EaP, which will be underpinned 
by a common EU vision for its eastern neighbor-
hood.1 But the new European Commission taking of-
fice on December 1 has only a few months left before 
the EaP Summit. At the same time, the EU has numer-
ous other immediate priorities to deal with, includ-
ing reaching consensus on how to mitigate risks to 
5G networks by the end of the year, putting forward 
legislation on artificial intelligence, and laying out the 
European Green Deal.2 There is also a very tight cal-
endar with the last European Council meeting before 
the EaP Summit currently scheduled for the end of 
March 2020. Effectively, the European Commission 
has only until mid-February to process all the feed-
back it has received from the structured consulta-
tion process on the future of the EaP (which closed 
1 European Commission, Mission Letter, Commissioner-designate for Neighborhood and Enlargement, November 7, 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/president-elect_von_der_leyens_mission_letter_to_oliver_varhelyi.pdf> (accessed November 19, 2019).
2 “Von der Leyen’s real 100-day challenge,” Politico, November 28, 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-european-commission-
first-100-days-timeline/?mc_cid=8764787057&mc_eid=6691982ad9> (accessed December 3, 2019).
on October 31, 2019) and to put together a compre-
hensive proposal. It will then have to steer its propos-
al through the European Council where the member 
states will seek many changes before they arrive at a 
common denominator. The time for internal discus-
sions and forming a sound, lasting consensus around 
the future EaP policy is therefore very short. 
Hostage to Bigger Issues
The core problems the EU needs to solve to arrive at 
a common vision are still the same as ten years ago 
when the EaP was launched: the future of enlarge-
ment and the Russia factor. In the past few months, 
both issues have become even more divisive in the 
context of France’s initiatives for rapprochement with 
Russia and an overhaul of the EU accession process. 
President Emmanuel Macron’s veto on opening ac-
cession talks with Albania and North Macedonia in 
October 2019 was a reminder that the member states 
are in the driver’s seat when it comes to enlargement. 
More broadly, there is little appetite for further en-
largement, and no consensus on whether providing 
a membership perspective, however distant, for EaP 
frontrunners such as Ukraine is a credible promise 
that could be made in 2020. The latter is mostly fa-
vored by Poland and the Baltic countries, but strong-
ly opposed by many other member states. Germany is 
not in favor, pointing out EU’s divisions and sensitiv-
ities on the matter. Another related issue is the lack 
of leadership on the EaP among the member states 
within the European Council. While ten years ago Po-
land and Sweden largely drove the process behind 
the launch of the EaP, the driving seat is now most-
ly empty. 
Like a decade ago, member states differ in their 
views on how to deal with Russia when it comes to 
the neighborhood they share. The region has be-
come much more contested, in particular after Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in 
eastern Ukraine since 2014. Russia’s assertiveness in 
the region, its hybrid warfare with the West, and its 
clear signals about not tolerating further expansion of 
the EU and NATO to the east have achieved the de-
sired effect in many European capitals, where there 
is a strong hesitation about any kind of confrontation 
with Russia. The EU needs to straighten its common 
position vis-à-vis Russia, regardless of the EaP, so as 
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not to undermine its aspiration to become a geopo-
litical power – but this is unlikely to happen before 
the EaP summit. Moreover, Macron’s wish for a rap-
prochement with Russia without consulting or coor-
dinating with other member states suggests more di-
vision than unity around the Russia question in the 
months to come.
Against this backdrop, the EaP issue is likely to be 
peripheral to other EU discussions. This limits the 
scope for more ambitious designs even more. 
Not a Priority, but Worth Prioritizing 
At the start of the new European Commission’s man-
date, and amid other priorities for the EU, the EaP 
currently ranks low on the agenda. Brexit and its re-
percussions, the negotiations for the EU’s next Mul-
tiannual Financial Framework, improving EU defense 
and security coordination, the difficult transatlan-
tic relations with President Donald Trump’s aggres-
sive protectionist policies, and China’s growing influ-
ence – to name only a few – all rank above the EaP 
among EU’s short- and medium-term priorities, and 
for good reason. Looking for consensus on a neigh-
borhood policy that divides more than it unites the 
member states is not what the EU currently needs 
the most. In parallel, Germany had the opportuni-
ty to host the EaP summit during its EU presidency, 
which starts in mid-2020, but it chose to give priori-
ty to other issues such as hosting the EU-China sum-
mit. As a result, Croatia will host the long-overdue 
EaP summit during its presidency in mid-June 2020 
in Brussels, just after a Western Balkans summit. 
While the EU is divided on how to deal with its east-
ern neighborhood, the EaP states are not in good 
shape either. The challenges of protracted transition 
processes, such as entrenched vested interests, have 
made it difficult for them to make any breakthroughs 
in the last decade when it comes not only to their 
overall democracy scores (see Figure 1), but also to 
specific issues such as rule of law (see Figure 2) and 
anti-corruption reforms (see Figure 3). The question 
that arises against this background is why the EU 
should bother with the EaP?
In the context of increasing multipolarity, its east-
ern neighbors are natural allies for the EU. Leaving 
these states as a buffer zone between Russia and the 
EU, with no clarity on their membership perspec-
tive, will alienate these societies at a time when the 
3 Stanislav Secrieru and Sinikkuka Saari, “The Eastern Partnership a Decade on. Looking Back, Thinking Ahead,” Chaillot Paper / 153, July 2019, pp. 13. 
<https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp153_EaP.pdf> (accessed November 19, 2019).
EU is still striving for a ring of friends in its neigh-
borhood while Russia attempts to reassert itself as a 
global power by violating the international order on 
the EU’s doorstep. Moreover, leaving the EaP coun-
tries as a buffer zone is no panacea for the EU’s lack 
of a coherent and coordinated policy towards Russia, 
and it will not eliminate the risk of a conflict. 
In the last decade, the EU has invested a lot of efforts 
in the EaP countries that have already produced tan-
gible long-term results. The EU became the top trad-
ing partner for Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine. There has been a steady increase in EaP cit-
izens going to work and study in EU countries rath-
er than Russia, and they are likely to bring back EU 
values and new standards to their home countries. 
Moreover, vast majorities in Armenia, Georgia, Mol-
dova, and Ukraine do not believe anymore in a come-
back of the Soviet Union.3 Modernizing societies, 
stronger civil society groups that act as watchdogs 
to keep their governments accountable, and better 
functioning and more diversified market economies 
are all the result of EU’s transformative power in the 
region. It is only a matter of time before generation-
al change and political conjuncture lead to changing 
governance patterns as well.
In the long run, the EU wants a functioning east-
ern neighborhood, rather than failed states, for its 
own security and stability. As an aspiring geopoliti-
cal power, it needs to see itself as a long-term play-
er in the region, with investments that do not nec-
essarily yield results immediately. The EU needs to 
assess its efforts through a state-building and sus-
tainability lens.
What is more, the EaP societies perceive them-
selves to be European. They strive to achieve Euro-
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pean living standards despite the challenges of tran-
sition and democratization. The EU is their pole of 
attraction, not Russia. Russia treating the region as 
its privileged zone of influence pushes these coun-
tries away in search of alternatives that would help 
strengthen their threatened statehood and sover-
eignty. The EU and the EaP countries face similar 
challenges to a large degree, be they demographic or 
security-related, and these need to be solved togeth-
er to enhance EU’s credibility, reputation, and reli-
ability, which are currently at stake not only in the 
region but also in the Western Balkans.
The year 2020 will give the EU an opportunity in its 
immediate neighborhood to prove it is a global ac-
tor able and willing to project power and influence. 
Though time is not on its side with a summit sched-
uled within half a year since the start of a new Euro-
pean Commission, which has more immediate prior-
ities to deal with, the EU needs to take the EaP to the 
next level to safeguard its strategic interests and to 
elevate the union itself to the next level. 
Dr Cristina Gherasimov is a re-
search fellow at the Robert Bosch 
Center for Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia and Central Asia 
at the German Council on Foreign 
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CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions and recommendations below draw 
on the four contributions in this report and the dis-
cussions during the sessions of the Russia-Eastern 
Partnership Strategy Group held throughout 2019. 
Addressing EaP Domestic Challenges
Due to strong Soviet legacies, democratization pro-
cesses in the EaP countries are complex process-
es that are frequently non-linear. Strong economic 
and security interdependencies with Russia still exist 
and, depending on how local elites deal with them, 
they can define the limits of the democratization ef-
forts in these countries that Western partners sup-
port. Domestic challenges such as entrenched vested 
interests and weak institutions of rule of law shape 
these limits further. As a result, the reform efforts 
the EaP governments undertake often prove to be 
inconsistent or reversible, which creates confusion, 
discontent, and fatigue among their international de-
velopment partners such as the EU and Germany. 
In each EaP state, however, there are like-minded 
segments of society that are willing to break with 
past dependencies and strive for a new democrat-
ic model that is closer to European standards and 
norms of good governance, thus paving the way to 
stronger democracies and a consolidated ‘ring of 
friends’ on the EU’s eastern border.
Recommendations for the EU:
1) Continue applying strong conditionality to the 
financial support and technical assistance that the 
EU provides to EaP governments. The EU should 
apply not only the ‘more for more’ principle, but also 
develop credible ‘less for less’ mechanisms for situa-
tions when countries roll back their reforms.
2) Work more intensely with like-minded civil society 
groups in the EaP countries to strengthen domes-
tic oversight over the reforms governments embark 
upon but are not always able to keep to. 
3) Pursue a differentiated approach towards the six 
EaP countries, and provide a credible member-
ship perspective, however distant, for those willing 
to embrace genuine democratic reforms. This will 
empower national elites that are willing to bring 
their societies closer to the EU.
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Addressing the EU’s and Germany’s Capacity to Act in the 
Neighborhood 
While they acknowledge the strategic importance of the 
eastern neighborhood, the EU is not prepared for the com-
prehensive foreign and security challenges it faces there 
and its member states are divided on how to approach 
them. Moreover, the EU is currently missing a driving force 
that would be able to build a political consensus among 
member states around an EaP policy beyond 2020. Con-
sumed by internal crises and external pressures, there is no 
political will to go beyond the implementation of the Associ-
ation Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
Recommendations for the EU:
1) While no EU member state has the capacity to lead towards 
an enhanced relationship with the EaP states, the ones 
interested in driving the debate forward should work 
together within ‘coalitions of the willing.’ Germany should 
strengthen its dialogue with interested member states 
(such as the Visegrád, Baltic, and Scandinavian countries), 
in particular if there is very limited EU consensus in June 
2020. 
2) Enable faster and deeper integration with the EU in the 
fields of energy, trade, transport, the digital economy, and 
customs for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, which seek 
more ambitious integration with the union.
3) Strengthen security cooperation with the EaP states by 
supporting the transformation and modernization of their 
armed forces and their security and defense sectors. This 
will help strengthen state and societal resilience to secu-
rity threats and Russian propaganda and disinformation, 
thus making the EU and the eastern neighborhood more 
secure and resilient. While some member states (including 
France) are reluctant to go in this direction at all as long 
as it antagonizes Russia, such security-related initiatives 
should be driven by a coalition of member states willing to 
cooperate in this policy domain. 
Addressing Rising Geopolitical Competition 
Third powers such as China and Turkey have become more 
prominent players in the EaP countries during the last de-
cade. This has been driven mainly by their growing relative 
power at the global level and their quest for new econom-
ic and diplomatic opportunities. In parallel, the EaP states 
are willing to initiate and deepen their relations with these 
third powers as a reaction to Russia’s military and econom-
ic assertiveness in the region. One effect of this diversifica-
tion of their economic and diplomatic ties is the weakening 
of the EU’s democratic conditionality and the development 
of alternative sources of international legitimacy for author-
itarian-like elites in the region. The rise of third powers in 
the EaP is here to stay as the region moves from a two-di-
mensional environment shaped by the West and Russia to a 
multi-dimensional one.
Recommendations for the EU:
1) Scrutinize more closely the growing diversification of trade 
relations and diplomatic partnerships in the EaP countries.
2) Devise a dual-track strategy that reinforces and multiplies 
the benign elements of the rise of third powers in the region 
and neutralizes its negative consequences. 
a) Coordinate and cooperate on overlapping agenda items 
with third powers to help strengthen the statehood and 
economic resilience of the EaP states.
b) Rely more on closer alliances with like-minded actors 
(the United States, Canada, Japan, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to defuse the 
negative effects of the third powers’ rise in the eastern 
neighborhood.
Defining EaP Objectives Beyond 2020
Against multiple competing short- and medium-term prior-
ities for the European Commission and the member states, 
the June 2020 summit will most likely not see bold propos-
als for the EU’s EaP policy beyond 2020 – not least because 
the EU lacks a common vision for how to engage with the 
region. Divisions among member states on enlargement and 
how to deal with Russia, similar to the ones present also in 
2009, will most likely curb the enthusiasm for what could be 
a truly historic moment for the EU and its eastern neigh-
borhood. Considering, however, the strategic importance of 
the region for the EU’s security, the investments that it has 
made through its EaP policy as well as the strong ties that it 
has developed with segments of societies in the region that 
work for more sustainable and resilient democracies, the EU 
could use the opportunity of the next EaP Summit to bold-
ly redefine its relationship with its eastern neighborhood. 
Recommendations for the EU:
1) Refocus policy in the EaP countries on pursuing democra-
tization rather than stabilization. 
2) Prioritize the development of a sustainable and credible 
framework for long-term engagement with the EaP coun-
tries that suits the levels of local demand and aspirations 
for closer ties with the EU.
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